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“Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other—it’s all a form of torture,” Haykel said. Decided that the best way to embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude? officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Ghraib. such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell—and the answer I got was, “This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done.” . “CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI’s request.” At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M. Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower. Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it. We were told that they had different rules.” Taguba wrote, “Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates.Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. 153399, and the bloodied body of another prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. ”In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included C. In a letter written in January, he said: I questioned some of the things that I saw . “His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’ ”In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the Abu Ghraib guards called “O. Ryder’s report, filed on November 5th, concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. When asked what MI said he stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us.’ ‘Make sure he has a bad night.’ ‘Make sure he gets the treatment.’ ” Military intelligence made these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. statements like, ‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They’re giving out good information.’ ”When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant Davis answered, “Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something.On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, an M. I saw SSG Frederick, SGT Davis and CPL Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. “Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state.” General Karpinski’s brigade, Ryder reported, “has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.” Ryder called for the establishment of procedures to “define the role of military police soldiers . Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not yet reached a crisis point. P.s, testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis. It is Graner and Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told C. He told of one night when a “bunch of people from MI” watched as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner and Frederick.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called “hard site” at Abu Ghraib—seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were considered the most dangerous were housed. I remember SSG Frederick hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.” His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup. General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers and private contractors.The men had been accused of starting a riot in another section of the prison. Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of one of the M. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and reprimanded.Wisdom said: SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. “Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder’s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation,” he wrote. agents, and private contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.”Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army C. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz, of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or ordering military policemen “who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by ‘setting conditions’ which were neither authorized” nor in accordance with Army regulations.(A spokeswoman for CACI said that the company had “received no formal communication” from the Army about the matter.)“I suspect,” Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and Israel “were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib,” and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior commanders. Some of the incidents had led to the killing or wounding of inmates and M.
Had she done so, he added, “cases of abuse may have been prevented.”General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the M. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources.General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone, was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system.Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling prisoners.Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in late February.Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army prison system were devastating.
There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.”Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his colleagues had not been given any “training guidelines” that he was aware of. P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003.